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ReviewView from the Top:
Hierarchies and Reverse Hierarchies
in the Visual System
the whole is surely built of its parts, how is it that the
parts remain unknown, while the whole becomes acces-
sible? This perceptual enigma is exemplified in percep-
tion under Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (an experi-
mental paradigm called RSVP, where pictures are
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presented in rapid sequence, typically 10 to 16 per sec-Jerusalem, 91904
ond, and observers are asked to detect and reportIsrael
something about one or all of them) and in related repeti-
tion and change blindnesses (the failure of observers
to report detail changes in alternating pictures or theWe propose that explicit vision advances in reverse
presence of two identical or similar objects). At ten im-hierarchical direction, as shown for perceptual learn-
ages per second, observers can identify picture or wording. Processing along the feedforward hierarchy of
categories (Potter, 1976) but are insensitive to repeti-areas, leading to increasingly complex represen-
tions of the same object (despite differences in size,tations, is automatic and implicit, while conscious
orientation, or viewpoint; Kanwisher, 1987). Observersperception begins at the hierarchy’s top, gradually re-
also fail to see large changes in a visual scene, eventurning downward as needed. Thus, our initial con-
at slower rates, as long as the gist remains the samescious percept—vision at a glance—matches a high-
(Rensink et al., 1997). The phenomenon of repetitionlevel, generalized, categorical scene interpretation,
blindness seems especially paradoxical: it implies thatidentifying “forest before trees.” For later vision with
processing has proceeded to the level of determiningscrutiny, reverse hierarchy routines focus attention
that one element is a conceptual or categorical repeti-to specific, active, low-level units, incorporating into
tion of another—a repetition to which we are then blind.conscious perception detailed information available
How can we know that two elements are similar if wethere. Reverse Hierarchy Theory dissociates between
are blind to the double occurrence? A similar paradoxearly explicit perception and implicit low-level vision,
appears when we briefly view a scene containing manyexplaining a variety of phenomena. Feature search
elements. We can more easily report the average value“pop-out” is attributed to high areas, where large re-
of a parameter (such as the mean size or orientation ofceptive fields underlie spread attention detecting cat-
elements) than judge if a particular value was presentegorical differences. Search for conjunctions or fine
in the scene (Ariely, 2001). How is the average computeddiscriminations depends on reentry to low-level spe-
without knowledge of the exemplars? Our answer tocific receptive fields using serial focused attention,
these questions will be that implicit processes makeconsistent with recently reported primary visual cortex
use of basic information (number of similar elements,effects.
detailed parameters of each element) to derive resulting
higher-level percepts (categories represented and theirLife can only be understood backward, but it must be
average values but not their number or precise location).lived forward.
However, only the results of these computations are—Søren Kierkegaard
accessible to conscious perception.
(2) The second issue concerns the very nature of rapid
perception, addressed cogently with the visual searchIntroduction
paradigm. Two search modes have been discerned:
Central to cognitive neuroscience today are three puz-
rapid, easy, feature search, which appears to be con-
zles related to two modes of perception and neuronal
ducted automatically and in parallel across an array of
processing. These related challenges concern the ap- elements, compared to slower, presumably serial
parent dichotomies between (1) rapid yet generalized search, which requires focused attention and shows
versus slower detailed perception, (2) between implicit a definite set-size effect (Treisman and Gelade, 1980).
and often automatic versus conscious and attentive per- Following more than two decades of research, it remains
ception, and (3) between perceptual learning effects that an open question what a priori rules define the mode of
transfer to new stimulation conditions and those that a particular search. Though rapid search was originally
are specific to the conditions of original training. We will found for quite simple features (suggesting to some a
show that these issues may be related to each other low-level underlying site), it was subsequently also
and to the division between feedforward, perhaps auto- found for quite high-level features, which include the
matic, visual processing versus mechanisms that are results of complex processing procedures (see below).
driven by focused attention and depend on the massive On the other hand, even the search for simple features
feedback connections found along the visual cortical is performed serially when the difference between target
hierarchy. and distractors is small—though well above the discrimi-
(1) The first issue is the apparent disparity between nation threshold. What then determines whether visual
our extremely rapid capture of the conceptual gist of a search will be automatic and parallel or attentive and
scene together with our blindness to its details. Since serial? We will attribute the rapid process to postimplicit
processing levels.
(3) The third question relates to the spread of training4Correspondence: shaul@vms.huji.ac.il
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Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of Classical Hi-
erarchy and Reverse Hierarchy Theory
Classically, the visual system was seen as
a hierarchy of cortical areas and cell types.
Neurons of low-level areas (V1, V2) receive
visual input and represent simple features
such as lines or edges of specific orientation
and location. Their outputs are integrated and
processed by successive cortical levels (V3,
V4, medial-temporal area MT), which gradu-
ally generalize over spatial parameters and
specialize to represent global features. Fi-
nally, further levels (inferotemporal area IT,
prefrontal area PF, etc.) integrate their out-
puts to represent abstract forms, objects, and
categories. The function of feedback connec-
tions was unknown. Reverse Hierarchy The-
ory proposes that the above forward hierar-
chy acts implicitly, with explicit perception
beginning at high-level cortex, representing
the gist of the scene on the basis of a first-
order approximate integration of low-level in-
put. Later, explicit perception returns to lower
areas via the feedback connections, to inte-
grate into conscious vision with scrutiny the
detailed information available there. Thus, initial perception is based on spread attention (large receptive fields), guessing at details, and
making binding or conjunction errors. Later vision incorporates details, overcoming such blindnesses.
effects. There are cases where training with one set of sites of generalized and where are those of specific
learning?spatial stimulus conditions affects later performance of
the same task under somewhat different spatial stimulus
conditions. In contrast, for apparently similar cases, Classical View of the Visual Hierarchy
Classical physiological studies of visual cortex con-learning effects may be substantially specific to the con-
ditions of training (reviewed in Ahissar and Hochstein, verged on three underlying principles. First, processing
as revealed by neuronal receptive fields is hierarchical,2002). What determines the extent of transfer of learning
effects? And when can we expect training to generalize beginning with the Simple and Complex cells described
by Hubel and Wiesel (1968). Neurons in higher corticalto new stimulation conditions? Recent results suggest
that early, easy-case learning is generalized, while areas represent increasingly complex characteristics of
images, objects, and categories (Maunsell and New-slower, difficult-case learning may be specific to spatial
conditions (Ahissar and Hochstein, 1997, 2000). We sug- some, 1987; Vogels and Orban, 1996). Higher neurons
are also less dependent on coincidental spatial features,gest that the degree of generalization depends on the
receptive field characteristics of neurons underlying the such as precise location, retinal size, viewpoint, lighting,
and color. This hierarchy is schematically representedtraining effects. (The receptive field of a single neuron
is the collection of visual stimuli that affect its response, in Figure 1. The second feature of the classical view
is the presence of multiple areas belonging to parallelincluding their locations and spatial characteristics. For
example, a V1 neuron might respond to a bar of light pathways, such as the dorsal and ventral streams (Un-
gerleider and Mishkin, 1982; Livingstone and Hubel,that is narrower than 1 of visual angle and shorter than
10, tilted at 30–50 clockwise from the vertical, and 1988; Goodale and Milner, 1992).
The third principle, that short- and long-term corticallocated at a specific region of the visual field. A neuron
in inferotemporal [IT] cortex may respond to a specific plasticity are limited to particular cortical sites, has un-
dergone substantial recent revision. Until the last de-face of size between 4–12 and location between 2
to 10 from the vertical meridian, viewed at a variety cade, learning (i.e., experience) and attention (i.e., con-
text) were seen as influencing high cortical areasof angles from frontoparallel and from vertical.)
The key to resolving these three dichotomies may lie (inferotemporal cortex or its human analog the lateral-
occipital complex and perhaps area V4 but not V1; Bush-in the hierarchy of processing levels in the visual system
and the feedforward and massive feedback connections nell et al., 1981; Moran and Desimone, 1985; Malach et
al., 1995). Although it was clear that feedback connec-among them. The functional roles and cognitive conse-
quences of this physiological-anatomical organization tions reach as low as V1 and even the LGN, their function
was largely ignored. As discussed below, recent physio-are still unknown. In particular, the sites of attention and
conscious perception have not been identified. Relating logical and functional MRI studies have now confirmed
top-down effects even in V1.to the above dichotomies, we wish to pinpoint (1) where
in the hierarchy are the mechanisms underlying very
rapid perception of the gist of a scene and where are Reverse Hierarchy of Perceptual Learning
We performed a series of studies on perceptual learningthose underlying slower access to its details; (2) where
are the procedures supporting parallel and where are and found that even training very simple tasks leads
to considerable performance improvement—seen as anthose for serial search modes; and (3) where are the
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Figure 2. Feature Integration Theory
Odd elements “pop-out” when they differ
substantially from the distractors in one fea-
ture, such as orientation (A) or color (B).
Search with serial focused attention is re-
quired if the odd element differs only in the
conjunction of features (C) or the spatial ar-
rangement of element parts (E and F) or if
the difference is small (D) (see Treisman and
Gelade, 1980; Treisman, 1988). Reverse Hier-
archy Theory assigns the pop-out phenome-
non to initial perception at high-level areas
using their large receptive fields, i.e., spread
attention. Later feedback reentry to low levels
slowly adds details available in the small spe-
cific receptive fields found there.
increase of up to a factor three in processing speed In summary, using transfer as a diagnostic sign of
cortical level, evidence from perceptual learning experi-(Ahissar and Hochstein, 1993). The task used was orien-
tation pop-out (Figure 2A). Subjects were consistently ments suggests the following. (1) Easy-condition learn-
ing occurs at high cortical levels, while difficult-condi-trained with one set of conditions and subsequently
tested with another set (e.g., with different target and/ tion training affects low levels. (2) There is a cascade
from initial high-level to subsequent low-level learning.or distractor element orientations, sizes, or locations).
Sometimes the learning effects transferred to these new That is, learning occurs in the visual cortex in reverse
conditions, and sometimes they did not (reviewed in
Ahissar and Hochstein, 2000, 2002; see bibliographies
there and chapters in Fahle and Poggio, 2002, for similar
findings with many other perceptual tasks). Transfer was
measured with several levels of difficulty determined by
target-distractor orientation difference, target position
uncertainty, and stimulus-to-mask delay. Systematic
analysis led to the conclusion that, as a rule, with easy
task conditions there is considerable learning transfer,
while with hard task conditions there is more learning
specificity (Ahissar and Hochstein, 1997; Liu, 1999). Fur-
thermore, there was a cascade of learning, such that
easy conditions were learned early and hard conditions
were learned later, as demonstrated in Figures 3A and
3B. This temporal order was mandatory. That is, when
training was attempted with only difficult cases, typi-
cally, no improvement was found. Learning difficult
cases only began after at least one clear and easy exam-
ple had been given (Ahissar and Hochstein, 1997; Rubin
et al., 1997).
An important contribution to our understanding came
by seeing transfer as a diagnostic sign of the cortical
level of learning (Fiorentini and Berardi, 1980; Ahissar
and Hochstein, 1997). Learning transfer derives from
modification at neurons with generalizing receptive
fields, found at high cortical levels, and specificity de-
rives from changes at neurons with localized receptive
fields, found at low cortical levels. Thus, easy-condition
learning transfer reflects tasks performed and learned
at high cortical levels, while hard-condition specificity
Figure 3. Cascade of Perceptual Learningis a sign of tasks depending on low cortical level mecha-
nisms. The cascade of learning from easy to hard condi- Training with interleaved easy and difficult trials (longer and shorter
stimulus-to-mask onset asynchronies or SOAs) leads to initial learn-tions suggests the conclusion that high-level learning
ing of easy trials and subsequent learning of more difficult trials.occurs before low-level learning, i.e., in reverse hierar-
This is seen in early changes in the long SOA part of the psychomet-chy order. The mandatory nature of this learning order
ric function and later changes in the short SOA part (A). Measuring
derives from low cortical level (hard condition) learning performance for each SOA, learning effects are clearly seen to have
needing guidance from prior (easy condition), high-level different time courses for the different SOAs (B). (Adapted from
Ahissar and Hochstein, 1997).learning.
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hierarchy order. (3) High-level training effects enable areas, and vision with scrutiny, which incorporates de-
tails available only in the small receptive fields at lowerand guide later learning at lower levels. We interpret
the inability of the system to directly initiate low-level cortical areas.
Under day-to-day conditions (rather than in controlledlearning as deriving from its limited access to appro-
priate populations at these levels. When nonsalient stim- laboratory experiments), we survey scenes continuously
rather than having pictures briefly flashed before us.ulus parameters need to be resolved, access is gained
gradually, by higher-level node intervention. Daily vision may still encompass the extreme at a glance
and with scrutiny modes. The default procedure of ex-We now suggest that the reverse hierarchy principles
found for perceptual learning may also apply to con- plicit vision may include high-level perception with
spread attention, supplemented by occasional forays toscious perception itself (though on a considerably
shorter time scale). In this way, the reverse hierarchy lower levels with focused attention. Nevertheless, we
will generally speak in terms of the laboratory situationsequence may be an inherent characteristic of visual
perception. of initial versus later perception, which more easily sepa-
rates these bottom-up (implicit) and top-down (explicit)
processes.Reverse Hierarchy of Explicit Perception
We use the term “explicit perception” to include stimu-
lus-driven experiences that are accessible to conscious Characteristics of Vision at a Glance
Initial Perception of Object Categoriesidentification and recognition (Goodale and Milner,
1992; Lumer and Rees, 1999) and/or to retrieval from As mentioned in the Introduction, the recently popular
studies using RSVP (rapid serial visual presentation)long-term memory store (Squire, 1986). We assume that
explicit perception is the reflection of cortical activity at demonstrated our phenomenal ability to rapidly detect
basic-level categories (100–200 ms; Potter, 1976). Forone or more sites, and we wish to identify these sites.
We do not assume that activity at a particular site always example, we can recall most words in a sentence pre-
sented at 12 words per second. With frame rates of 8is, or is available to, the neural correlate of conscious-
ness (Crick and Koch, 1995). For example, we take the per second, we are able to detect the presence of a
previewed picture, of a picture containing a pre-namedstand that attention, whether focused or spread, is re-
quired for explicit perception. category (e.g., an animal), or of a picture not containing
the pre-named category (Intraub, 1999). The propertiesWe suggest a new view of visual perception, Reverse
Hierarchy Theory (RHT), proposing that explicit visual of this rapid detection match those of high-level cortical
neurons representing basic categories. The high-levelperception follows the visual hierarchy in reverse direc-
tion, from top to bottom, as outlined in Figure 1. Initial category neurons use detailed information implicitly—
i.e., they receive input from low-level neurons whosefeedforward implicit processing follows the bottom-up
hierarchical pathway, but not all processing is directly receptive fields represent these details—but these de-
tails themselves are not represented in the high-levelavailable to conscious perception. Instead, explicit vi-
sual perception only begins when processing reaches neurons and are therefore not immediately accessible
to consciousness. Thus, it is easier to report a brieflyhigh cortical levels and proceeds in top-down fashion
to gradually encompass detailed information available presented word than its font or that a picture contained
an apple than its color, even though the font characteris-at more peripheral cortical areas as needed. Details in-
corporated at later stages of conscious vision include tics or apple color were implicitly used to determine the
categorical percept. The principle of high-level repre-precise location, retinal size and color, and component
motion. The parallel forward and reverse hierarchy path- sentation is that these categorical mechanisms general-
ize over space, size, viewpoint, etc., so that their activityways mentioned above may be responsible for separate
integration of form, motion, and color details. Our osten- indicates the presence of the basic category or object
type but not its precise parameters.sibly unidimensional scheme does not directly address
lateral interactions within and between cortical areas While basic-level categories are detected at a glance,
subordinate categories require further processing (Roschnor control functions of parietal or other areas. While
these obviously play an essential role, our current focus et al., 1976). It may be thought that the latter processing
occurs at the same or at even higher levels. Such higherwill be the function of bottom-up and top-down hierar-
chical connections. The large receptive fields of high levels have not been found, however. We suggest a third
alternative: since subordinate category identification re-cortical areas are reflected in the spread attention of
initial perception, while smaller low-area receptive fields quires incorporation of fine details, it should involve
reverse hierarchy routines. Thus, subordinate catego-are responsible for later focused attention. Initial explicit
perception with spread attention “detects” objects by a ries are determined by basic-level membership—rep-
resented by high-level neurons—supplemented by spe-first approximation “guess” as to the binding of features
(arriving perhaps from separate streams) falling within cific characteristics, represented lower. The difference
between basic and subordinate categories is often athe same large high-level receptive fields. Given this
initial crude binding, one function of reentry is to confirm matter of experience with the environment. With training,
new basic categories may be learned. Whether thisor refute such initial guesses.
Conscious vision appears as a continuum between learning derives from high-level neurons becoming
tuned to the new categories is an open question.two modes, related to representations in the reverse
hierarchy top-down cascade of cortical areas. At the two Blindnesses of Initial Perception
It has been found that together with the amazing abilityextremes are vision at a glance, with spread attention
depending on the large receptive fields of higher cortical to rapidly capture scene categories there is an equally
Review
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Figure 4. High Cortical Level Determination
of Initial Conscious Visual Perception
(A) Repetition blindness. Categorical repeti-
tions in time or space are often overlooked,
as are the repeated words “is” and “when”
in this sign (Kanwisher, 1987; Luo and Cara-
mazza, 1996).
(B) The very first view of an ambiguous figure
produces an integrated percept of one possi-
ble interpretation, not an ambiguous collec-
tion of lines and colored regions.
(C) When large letters are composed of small
letters, the initial percept usually matches the
more global stimulus (Navon, 1977).
(D) Subjects more easily detect a masked
word than a masked letter, even if the differ-
ence between the words to be chosen from
is only in that letter (Johnston and McClelland
1974).
(E) Apparent motion. If the image presented
is made up of alternations between the white
and the yellow dots, the global percept is of either horizontal or vertical motion of all the dots but not intermixed motions (Ramachandran
and Anstis, 1983). Thus, initial explicit motion perception is global and high level.
amazing initial blindness to the details in a scene. For reduced—leading, for example, to decreased pop-out
detection (Ahissar et al., 2001).example, with RSVP, observers easily miss repetitions
The lack of precision of default scene perception—within closely successive pictures (or even in a single
when specific scrutiny of details is not called for—haspicture; Figure 4A), and they are often unable to report
also been demonstrated when observers are asked topicture details. As pointed out above, an intriguing factor
draw a picture that they have seen. They tend to “re-of repetition blindness is that the second presentation
member” having seen a greater expanse of the sceneneed not be an identical replica of the first, so that
than had been in the photograph (Intraub, 1999). Thesedetermining that it was a repetition is not at all trivial.
false-positive errors may be related to high-level pro-Kanwisher (1987) suggested that we perceive “types”
cesses perceiving object categories within the scene—(categories) separately from “tokens” (specific exem-
and not (yet) the detail that these objects are only par-plars), and in the case of RSVP, we pick up only the
tially in view.types. In our view, a brief exposure allows high-level
Global Priority and Coherence of Initial Perceptioncortical neurons to build initial representations of the
There are numerous other examples of the immediacygist of the scene, including generalized categories of
and priority of global perception. The Gestalt schoolelements within it but not their details. We thus interpret
change blindness (where moderately large changes be-
tween successively viewed scenes are missed; Rensink
et al., 1997) as another instance of the same initial-vision
blindness (Figures 5 and 6). We predict that blindness
will only be found for changes that do not affect the
categories of the objects explicitly perceived in the
scene. On the other hand, prolonged repeated viewing
allows for the serial introduction of details, by returning
to low-level cortical representations, with small re-
ceptive fields, focusing attention to one area or object
at a time (Balz and Hock, 1997; Hock et al., 1998). View-
ers only notice the changes when attention is serendipi-
tously focused on the location of the change.
There are limits and costs, however, to including
lower-level information with focused attention. The re-
turn to lower-area details is limited and serial in nature.
At the same time, high-level gist-of-the-scene sensitivity
is reduced when attention is focused rather than spread.
These effects may be responsible for the phenomenon
of inattentional blindness, whereby subjects often fail
Figure 5. Change Blindnessto report the appearance of an otherwise salient, distinc-
Whereas high-level units rapidly acquire the gist of the scene bytive, but unexpected item when they are in the midst of
integrating bottom-up information to form a categorical representa-performing a task that demands focused attention
tion, details are not acquired without later focusing attention to
(Mack and Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2001). Similarly, when them. Observers often require multiple viewings to perceive most
attention is pre-cued to a particular location, the sensi- of the differences between this figure and Figure 6 on the following
page.tivity of the high-level spread attention mechanism is
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high level, as evidenced by its being influenced by color,
global interactions, and adaptation or learning effects
(Kooi et al., 1992). All of these are high-level aspects of
initial explicit perception pointing to its following intri-
cate implicit hierarchical processing. Low-level mecha-
nisms can represent conflicting evidence in parallel
(Cumming and Parker, 1997)—leading to adaptation and
priming even for aspects not incorporated in the explicit
percept (Hock et al., 1996). High-level representations,
however, are generally mutually exclusive, leading to a
single, globally constrained percept.
One advantage of reverse hierarchy processing may
be that initial high area organization of information can
be used for guiding attention to selected subgroups of
previously activated low-level neurons (Cave and Wolfe,
1990). Top-down effects following initial feedforward
processing allow for space- and/or object-based atten-
tion (Duncan, 1984; Vecera and Farah, 1994) and even
attention following figure/ground determination (Wong
Figure 6. Change Blindness and Weisstein, 1982). Reverse hierarchy guidance may
Observers require “vision with scrutiny,” serially focusing attention follow the route of initially activated (feedforward) con-
to different scene details, to find the differences between this figure nections, focusing attention on appropriate active inputs
and Figure 5 on the preceding page. Hint: besides the categorically to higher-level units (perhaps directed by parietal cortex
and thus obviously different item on the lawn, look for positions or and/or the Pulvinar, especially when multiple objectsshapes of windows and the chimney, as well as the number of steps
need to be attended; see Humphreys, 1998).to the door.
Characteristics of Initial Feature Binding
There is another reason for associating initial aspects
of explicit visual perception with high area detectionemphasized the immediate perception of global attri-
mechanisms. If initial perception would depend only onbutes without conscious awareness that the visual sys-
separate low area feature maps, then initial vision shouldtem was processing individual elements to form a whole.
perceive colors, orientations, and motions, not con-According to the reverse hierarchy view, the whole is
joined forms. Yet, our very first vision at a glance is notperceived first due to explicit perception initially ac-
of such unattached free-floating features but rather ofcessing only high-level representations. Subsequent
coherent conjoined objects. The occasional presence ofstudies noted that we consciously perceive words be-
illusory conjunctions—i.e., incorrectly bound features,fore letters (Figure 4D; Johnston and McClelland, 1974),
e.g., when associating with a presented shape the color
scenes before the objects composing them (Biederman
of a neighboring shape—is due to incorrectly bound
et al., 1974), and in picturesque terms, “the forest before
features, but bound features nevertheless. Such false
the trees” (Figure 4C; Navon, 1977). As mentioned
conjunctions across retinal positions cannot be the out-
above, subjects more easily report the average value of come of locally restricted low-level visual representa-
a parameter, such as the size or orientation of elements, tions. They must result instead from initial bottom-up
in a scene than they can judge if a particular value was convergence from multiple locations. The likelihood of
present in it (Ariely, 2001). false conjunctions in a manner that matches prior knowl-
The initial explicit percept is of a complex coherent edge of the environment, such as round green apple
scene, even when it contains conflicting or ambiguous and elongated yellow banana, is higher than that of other
possible interpretations. For example, the immediate false conjunctions (Treisman, 1986). These biases reflect
conscious percept of an ambiguous image (e.g., Figure the initial assignment of familiar combinations of fea-
4B) is of one alternative based on global features, never tures to specific objects. Thus, initial object recognition
an ambiguous sensation between or combining the two incorporates a priori “assumptions” influenced by expe-
alternatives. Similarly, conflicting stimuli to the two eyes, rience. These features of initial high-level vision are a
yielding binocular rivalry, often produce a single (per- natural and direct outcome of the receptive field proper-
haps changing) percept. In the same way, conflicting ties of object-related neurons.
aspects of a single picture may be integrated without Detailed scrutiny, focusing attention to particular lo-
noticing the conflicts, as in the “impossible” figures cations or objects, unbinds illusory conjunctions of fea-
made famous by Escher. The initially perceived solution tures and rebinds the features veridically to identify
to the apparent motion correspondence problem is also items actually within the scene. Thus, vision with scrutiny
a global one. Thus, in a multi-spot ambiguous motion is required to unbind initial incorrect conjunctions and
situation, one may perceive the spots as moving in one revise vision at a glance when unexpected conjunctions
or another direction, but one always perceives all the are present in the scene.
spots as moving in the same direction (Figure 4E; Rama- In summary, results concerning initial scene percep-
chandran and Anstis, 1983). Similarly, plaids may be tion suggest that we perceive categorical information
seen as moving in coherence or as gratings sliding over at a glance (using high-level cortical mechanisms) and
each other, but the earliest percept is of one or the miss (or assume) details that are detected by lower areas
but not represented in individual high-level receptiveother, never of ambiguously both. Again, the percept is
Review
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fields. Only later do we consciously perceive these de- Reverse Hierarchy of Visual Search
We propose the opposite conclusion, that featuretails veridically by focusing serially on components and
search reflects high cortical level activity based on large,features, slowly scanning them one at a time.
spread-attention receptive fields. This leads to position-
and size-invariant feature detection, as suggested by
the Feature Integration Theory (Treisman and Gormican,Visual Search
1988). We suggest that pop-out is another manifestationTwo Search Modes
of rapid but high-level vision at a glance. Note that theTwenty years ago, Treisman noted that there are two
time required to enable observers to report an odd ele-modes of visual search, which she called “feature” or
ment is about the same as that needed to detect apop-out search versus “conjunction” or serial search
complex category in an RSVP task, namely, about 100(Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Treisman, 1988, 1993). As
ms (as measured by stimulus-to-mask onset asynch-illustrated in Figures 2A and 2B, when the target element
rony rather than reaction time; see Figure 3A). Accordingis defined by a single distinctive feature (such as a large
to this view, the features that pop out and their charac-difference in color, orientation, or size from distractor
teristics will match those of high- but not low-level re-elements), its detection is rapid and parallel (indepen-
ceptive fields. Indeed, over the years, anecdotal evi-dent of the number of distractors). On the other hand,
dence came to light presenting exceptions to the rulewhen the target element differs only a little or only in a
that feature search should be possible only for basicconjunction of features or parts, its detection is often
features. Furthermore, pop-out clearly follows a varietyset-size dependent, as if requiring serial focused atten-
of cortical computations.tion, as demonstrated in Figures 2C–2F. According to
Many high-level features pop out, as demonstratedTreisman’s Feature Integration Theory (FIT), simple fea-
in Figures 7 and 8. These include depth from shadingtures are registered in parallel in specialized subsys-
(Figure 7D; Ramachandran, 1988), facial expressionstems. Focused attention is needed to serially scan, inte-
(Ohman et al., 2001), and one’s own face (Tong andgrate, and bind these features. When attention is
Nakayama, 1999), 3D features (Figure 7B; Enns and Ren-overloaded, illusory conjunctions are formed, i.e., veridi-
sink, 1990), surface planes (He and Nakayama, 1992),cal binding of features requires focused attention. Thus,
parts and wholes (Wolfe et al., 1994), and perceptualspread attention, which suffices for feature detection,
groups (Bravo and Blake, 1990).contrasts with focused attention required for identifying
Feature search depends not on measurable spatialconjunctions (Treisman and Gormican, 1988; Treisman,
characteristics, but on feature categories, represented1993, 1999). A basic tenet of FIT is that initial vision
at high-level cortex. Even the simplest features that pop-identifies elements without registering their precise lo-
out, such as orientation, incorporate category-like char-cation.
acteristics rather than direct metric properties (e.g.,The properties of feature search, including its speed,
steep versus shallow or left versus right tilted). For ex-automaticity, and locality, together with the elementary
ample, oddly oriented bars that are mirror images of thenature of the features that were found to pop-out, led
distracting bars do not pop-out (e.g., it is harder to noticeto the suggestion that the odd element is detected at
a bar oriented at50 from the vertical on a field of50low-level processing stages where neuronal responses
oriented distractors than to find one of10 on the samewere believed to be largely determined by retinal input
background; Wolfe et al., 1992). Similarly, the presence(Desimone and Ungerleider, 1989). The dependence of
of a Vernier offset pops out of distractors with abuttingfeature detection on local gradients seemed to imply that
lines, but a right-offset will not pop-out in a field ofthese stages may be as early as areas V1–V3 (Sagi and
left-offset Verniers (Fahle, 1990). Treisman and othersJulesz, 1987; Nothdurft, 1991; Nothdurft et al., 1999),
reported a large number of asymmetries in rapid visualand this notion was supported by physiological (Knierim
search. Oblique bars pop-out from an array of vertical
and Van Essen, 1992; Kastner et al., 1997) and anatomi-
bars, orange from among reds, “C”s among “O”s, and
cal (Merigan et al., 1993) studies. However, associating
so on, but not vice versa (Treisman and Gormican, 1988).
initial feature search with low cortical areas has been These were understood as deriving from there being
questioned in a number of ways: low-level neuronal a limited set of canonical feature maps, representing
mechanisms have precise position information, while primary orientations, colors, and special features such
pop-out does not (Atkinson and Braddick, 1989); they as circles and gaps. Wolfe et al. (1992) summarized
discriminate fine orientation or color differences that do many findings of this nature, concluding that features
not pop-out, and their receptive fields are too small for that pop-out are better described in terms of categories
lateral inhibition among distractors to be the source of than as measurable spatial characteristics. We now pro-
pop-out. In addition, the basis for this association was pose that selection of canonical forms reflects high cor-
the presumed “automaticity” of pop-out, while recent tical level characteristics and are natural outcomes of
studies indicate that attention, albeit spread, is required the categorization of properties found there.
for feature search, i.e., it depends on limited resources, Feature search involves discriminating between the
since simultaneous performance of another task may odd element and elements that are similar to their neigh-
interfere with it (Joseph et al., 1997; Ahissar et al., 2001). bors. As such, it must involve mechanisms that respond
Furthermore, while some of the simple features that to many neighboring elements. However, it has been
pop-out (such as orientation, color, motion, and depth) found that feature search is largely scale independent
are represented in V1, others are not—including closure (Julesz, 1986). Thus, if one views an array at a given
and geometric shape (e.g., circles versus rectangles; we distance and an oddly oriented element pops-out, a
similar pop-out will occur with viewing at a large rangerelate to pop-out of more complex features below).
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Figure 7. Evidence for High-Level Basis of
Feature Search
Complex features also pop out, including 3D
shape ([B], from Enns and Rensink, 1990) and
depth from shading ([D], from Ramachan-
dran, 1988) but not similar luminance ar-
rangements (A and C).
of distances. Although the apparent size remains largely categories of objects, which are represented at these
levels. In an attempt to map the behavioral pop-outthe same, retinal size of each element can vary, and pop-
out remains. Furthermore, most pop-out presentations phenomenon to neuronal representations, we hypothe-
size that for a target object to pop-out it must be repre-utilize fixed-size elements, although cortical size differs
greatly as one scans different eccentricities, and still sented by a neuronal population that does not overlap
with the population representing the distractors. Thepop-out is obtained. In general, feature search works
for a vast range of spatial scales, sizes, and interelement current understanding of high-level neuronal represen-
tation supports one such segregation clearly: recentdistances (once local grouping has been eliminated;
Bacon and Egeth, 1991), including values that are far fMRI studies indicate that face representation is largely
separated from that of other objects, in particular,larger than predicted from the small receptive fields of
low-level areas. All these conditions are consistent with houses (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Levy et al., 2001). We
would thus expect pictures of faces to pop-out on thea high-level rather than a low-level attribution.
Evidence for placing feature search higher rather than background of houses.
To test this prediction, Elgavi-Hershler and Hochsteinlower in the hierarchy comes also from findings that
illusion effects act prior to pop-out mechanisms. Thus, (O. Elgavi-Hershler and S. Hochstein, 2002, Vis. Sci.
Soc., abstract) gathered drawings or photographs ofpop-out is determined by elements’ perceived or appar-
ent size rather than by the size of their retinal representa- houses, cars, and faces and measured the dependence
of target detection on the number of distractor elementstion. For example, the shape “” pops-out of a field of
“L”s if the bars of each are the same retinal length (Ber- (Figure 9). Reaction time for detecting a picture with a
face on a background of pictures of houses or carsgen and Julesz, 1983). However, the appearance of the
bars are very different in the two cases, with those on the (even when distractors differed in shape and size) was
independent of set size, as expected from parallel fea-“”s appearing considerably shorter due to the bisected
line illusion. If one extends the “” bars so that they ture search. Thus, this important high-level category
does pop-out. In this demonstration, pop-out could beappear as long as those of the “L”s, then the “” no
longer pops-out (Figure 8A; Bergen and Adelson, 1988). attributed to some basic feature that differentiates
houses from faces (e.g., curvature). However, when try-Similarly, salience of the odd element in feature search
is affected by length, as determined by the Mueller-Lyer ing to control for roundness and all other “special” fea-
tures in faces (or houses), it was very difficult to retain theillusion (Figure 8B; Rensink and Enns, 1995), and by
depth, as determined by texture gradient (Aks and Enns, immediate perception of “faceness” (or “houseness”).
Thus, simple, low-level detected features may indeed1996).
Other studies show that pop-out also follows comple- facilitate pop-out of high-level categories. We suggest
that it is exactly the property of being relevant for high-tion processes. When a scene includes partially oc-
cluded shapes or objects, there is rapid completion of level categorization that yields their salience in explicit
perception. That is, we believe that it is the implicit usethe fragments so that completed shapes are quickly
recognized. Most striking, however, is the finding that of basic features in explicit recognition of high-level
categories that renders these features capable of pro-the fragments themselves—though they are obviously
the cues to the presence of the completed forms, do ducing pop-out: circles pop-out of squares because
faces pop-out of houses, not vice versa. Figure 9 (bot-not pop-out, that is, they are not immediately available
to conscious perception (Figure 8C; Rensink and Enns, tom right) demonstrates that affecting the high-level in-
terpretation of a picture (by scrambling elements of a1995, 1998). Only with focused scrutiny can we become
aware of these forms. We conclude, therefore, that low schematic face so that it no longer looks like a face)
induces pop-out, while totally erasing one element whilecortical mechanisms do not support explicit pop-out;
only high cortical areas can underlie pop-out. leaving its face-like nature does not. In this way, Reverse
Hierarchy Theory proposes an a priori concept regardingDo Faces Pop-Out?
Assuming that feature search reflects higher-level re- which features will pop-out, namely, those that underlie
differences between basic categories. Indeed, we alsoceptive field properties, we would expect pop-out for
Review
799
ences in basic dimensions is very similar to conjunction
search in reaction time and set-size dependence. Thus,
while a large difference in orientation or color pops-
out, a small difference requires search with scrutiny. We
propose that both conjunction search and fine detail
discrimination search depend on low-level area neu-
rons. For example, the minimal orientation or color dif-
ference that is sufficient for successful search with fo-
cused-attention scrutiny is far smaller than that which
yields rapid parallel search (orientation detection with
prolonged scrutiny:5, Vogels and Orban, 1985; orien-
tation pop-out: 20, Bergen and Julesz, 1983; Noth-
durft, 1991; color, Nagy and Sanchez, 1991). Similarly,
serial search is needed to find an element surrounded
by distractors with orientations (or colors) that flank that
of the target (Figure 10B, D’Zmura, 1991; Figure 10D,
right, Wolfe et al., 1992). Thus, the receptive fields of
V1 neurons support the values for scrutiny detection far
better than do those of IT, and the opposite is the case
for pop-out detection.
Even in the context of fast pop-out orientation detec-
tion, if observers are required to specify the exact target
position, responses become closer to slow conjunction
search. That is, observers need less time to identify
target orientation than to accurately localize it (Atkinson
and Braddick, 1989), supporting our conclusion that ex-
plicit perception gains access rather late to low-level
computations where spatial localization information is
encoded. Finally, evidence for low-level conjunction
search comes from tests with a partially split-brain pa-
tient (where high-level area connections were spared).
Distractors added to the hemifield without the target
had no effect on conjunction search times, suggesting
that search was accomplished in low-level, functionally
split areas (H. Esteky et al., 2001, Soc. Neurosci., ab-
stract).
Figure 8. Evidence that Feature Search follows Considerable Im-
Physiological Evidence for Reverse Hierarchyplicit Processing
Reverse Hierarchy Theory has direct predictions for the
(A) Due to the crossed-line illusion, the lines of “”s appear shorter
dynamics of activity in low-level cortical areas. Initialthan do those of “L”s. Thus, “”s pop out among “L”s, except when
activity following stimulus initiation should be stimulustheir lines are stretched (from Bergen and Adelson, 1988).
(B) Perceived length—and pop-out—are determined by the Miller- driven, localized, and automatic. It is expected to reflect
Lyer illusion (Rensink and Enns, 1995). the basic bottom-up implicit processing leading to the
(C) Due to amodal completion, the partially occluded square does first vision at a glance percept in higher-level cortex.
not pop out, though a similarly shaped element does (Rensink and However, activity should continue with reentrant feed-
Enns, 1998).
back along the reverse hierarchy, when and if vision with
scrutiny is activated. This later activity would reflect
top-down effects, including space- and object-basedfound pop-out when using photographs rather than line
drawings of faces, houses, and cars. attention. These predictions are consistent with a range
of recent findings in a variety of behavioral paradigmsLow-Level Cortical Involvement
in Conjunction Search including feature search.
Reentry to lower areas may be investigated by unitAdditional support for the new view comes from difficult
conjunction search having the quantitative characteris- recording in the behaving primate or by imaging tech-
niques. Recent studies were successful in finding signifi-tics of low-level cortical areas. First and foremost, the
small receptive fields of low-level neurons are natural cant attention effects in lower areas, including V1 (Mot-
ter, 1993; Rosenthal and Hochstein, 1994; Gandhi et al.,candidates for serving as the substrate for focused-
attention vision with scrutiny. Of course, it is conceivable 1999; Sengpiel and Hubener, 1999) and early extrastriate
areas (Treue and Maunsell, 1996; O’Craven et al., 1997;that higher levels recompute fine position information.
However, a more efficient method would be the use of Hillyard et al., 1998). Thus, even primary visual cortex
may participate in figure-ground segregation (Lamme,feedback pathways to retrieve the information that is
readily available there. Appropriate low-level locations 1995), attentive and conscious scene analysis (Lamme
and Spekreijse, 2000), context information (Zipser et al.,may be selected by detecting active bottom-up inputs.
It has long been noted that search based on fine differ- 1996), and high-level vision (Lee et al., 1998) via feed-
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Figure 9. Search for Faces Is Easy as Predicted by Easy Search Being High Level
Subjects reported the presence or absence of an odd element in an array of 16, 36, or 64 elements presented on a computer monitor. Targets
and distractors were line drawings of faces, houses, or cars, as demonstrated on the left for face targets among car or house distractors.
The graph shows performance as a function of set size. Note that with faces as target or distractor, there is no dependence on set size for
target presence trials (red and green solid lines) and a small slope for target absent trials (dashed lines)—the signature of easy feature search.
For car or house target on house or car distractors, there are larger slopes in both cases (O. Elgavi-Hershler and S. Hochstein, 2002, Vis. Sci.
Soc., abstract). Bottom right: with schematic elements, using rearranged parts to make up the face and house images, search is still easy.
In addition, a non-face (with scrambled elements) pops-out, but a noseless face does not.
Figure 10. When Two Distractors Are Pres-
ent, Search Is Hard when the Target Lies be-
tween Them in Feature Space but Is Easy
Otherwise
(A–C) Red (or yellow) pops out of orange and
yellow (or red) distractors, but orange does
not pop out of red and yellow distractors
(from D’Zmura, 1991).
(D) 45 pops out of 15 and 315 distractors
but not from 15 and 75 distractors (from
Wolfe et al., 1992).
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Table 1. Comparison of Old and New Theories of Conscious Visual Perception
Common View RHT Proposal
Mechanism Site Time Site Time Evidence
Gist of scene perception; basic level high late high early RSVP phenomena; rapid scene detection; illusory
categorization conjunctions
Subordinate categories high late low late High areas represent basic categories; no evidence
for still higher areas representing subordinate
categories
Focused attention high late low late Late attention effects in V1; “inattentional”
blindness; object-centered attention →
top-down guided
Feature search pop-out; illusory low early high early High-level features and large j.n.d.; parallel search
conjunctions (spread attention) → large receptive fields;
dual-task interference → attention; no
free-floating features
Search for conjunctions and difficult high late low late Discrimination j.n.d. matches low-level fine
discriminations resolution
Easy condition perceptual learning high late high early Rapid generalized learning; “eureka” enabling
phenomena
Hard condition perceptual learning high late low late Slow specific learning that requires prior enabling
back processing (Li et al., 2000; Pascual-Leone and serve the ability to define objects defined by texture
gradients (Malach et al., 1995).Walsh, 2001). Newer studies failed to replicate V1 figure-
ground dependence, though they did find long-latency
responses to texture stimuli well outside the classical Discussion
In conclusion, we suggest a reversal of the way of under-receptive field (Rossi et al., 2001). Most importantly, new
reports suggest that attention affects only late portions standing conscious perception and its relationship to
cortical mechanisms. Based on results from featureof low area responses (Nobre et al., 1998; Roelfsema et
al., 1998; Martinez et al., 1999) via feedback processing search, vision at a glance and vision with scrutiny have
been viewed as reflecting, respectively, low-level and(Li et al., 2000; Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001). V1
attention effects are consistent not only with a space- high-level cortical representations. Thus, effortless sim-
ple feature detection has been seen as reflecting mecha-based spotlight of attention but also with object-based
attention (Somers et al., 1999; Tipper and Behrmann, nisms operating at lower levels. Subsequent studies
finding that the pop-out phenomenon also occurs for1996). The simple hierarchical model associating low-
level cortex with automatic early vision and high-level complex features challenged this view, while accumulat-
ing evidence for global precedence was viewed as ancortex with later attentional perception does not fit these
new findings. Instead, top-down attention effects at low- oddity.
We propose instead that vision at a glance reflectslevel areas seem to be subsequent to initial object per-
ception in higher-level cortex, as predicted by Reverse high-level mechanisms, while vision with scrutiny re-
flects a return to low-level representations. ReversingHierarchy Theory.
Recent physiological findings (Lee et al., 2002) directly the anatomical associations puts many sets of seem-
ingly conflicting data in a single coherent framework, assupport the high-level site of feature search and top-
down reentrant aspect of later involvement of low-level illustrated in Table 1. Thus, early spread attention re-
flects the large receptive fields found in high-level areas,areas. These investigators recorded single-unit activity
in V1 and found that neurons responded equally to fields and focused attention reflects localized low-level repre-
sentations. High-level spread attention subserves ourof elements whether or not they were of the type that
produced behavioral pop-out. Displays with a single initial, crude global percept of the gist of the scene. Pop-
out is but one aspect of this crude initial assessment.element produced a large response, but multi-element
arrays with or without an odd element produced only a Associating early conscious perception with high corti-
cal level mechanisms has implications for attentionalsmaller response. However, after monkeys were trained
to remember the precise location of the pop-out and phenomena as well. For example, Feature Integration
Theory is an “early selection” theory (Broadbent, 1958),use this information to direct a subsequent saccade,
then the response to the pop-out type stimulus was meaning that attention is required to bind elementary
features into objects (Treisman, 1999). In the RHT view,enhanced to the level of that of the single element—
though only belatedly (120 ms after onset). early high-level perception makes a first approximation
guess at binding, and focused attention—by return toThus, as predicted by Reverse Hierarchy Theory, V1
was not used for pop-out, but its activity reflected later low levels—is required to confirm or correct this guess
and to veridically bind features. Since vision at a glanceavailability of specific detailed information. Instead, the
ability to detect orientations quickly must stem from allows for spread attention parallel processing, RHT may
resemble a “late selection” theory (Deutsch and Deutsch,the representation of orientation gradients at high-level
areas. Such representations were found by single-unit 1963), e.g., allowing for attention to objects (Duncan,
1984; Vecera and Farah, 1994). However, RHT predictsmethods (Vogels and Orban, 1996) and large-scale im-
aging techniques. In higher-level areas, they also sub- that when attention is focused down to specific low-
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level cortical activity, default high-level detection may the gist of the scene. Later, these same low-level areas
be compromised, and parallel activity may go unnoticed form the correlates of explicit perception of scene de-
(as in inattentional blindness; see above). Taken to- tails. This dual role is probably most easily accommo-
gether, RHT predictions may be more in line with a con- dated by a special activity rather than a special area
trolled parallel processing model (Pashler, 1998). model.
The idea of late access to low-level information is part
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